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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
REGISTERED NURSE BARGAINING UNITS:
UNDUE PROLIFERATION?
NLRB v. St. Francis Hospital'
St. Francis Registered Nurses Association, United Nurses Associations
of California (the union) filed a petition for a representation election for
a unit of registered nurses employed at St. Francis Hospital (the hospital).
At the hearing on the bargaining unit determination, the hearing officer
for the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) refused to admit evi-
dence offered by the hospital to support a finding of an all-professional
unit, instead of the unit consisting solely of registered nurses requested by
the petitioner.2 The regional director subsequently held that the unit
comprised exclusively of registered nurses (RNs) was an appropriate bar-
gaining unit and ordered an election. In doing so he rejected the hospital's
claim that the hearing officer made prejudicial error in refusing evidence to
support the appropriateness of an all-professional unit.
The union won the election, was certified, and sought to bargain.
When the hospital refused to bargain, the union filed unfair labor practice
charges, and a complaint was issued. Finding that the hospital was trying
to relitigate matters considered by the regional director below, the Board
granted summary judgment at the hearing on the complaint. The Board
ordered the hospital to bargain 3 and upon refusal sought enforcement of
its order in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals
denied enforcement.
These issues were considered on appeal: (1) whether the hearing of-
ficer erred in refusing evidence offered by the hospital which supported an
all-professional unit, instead of an RN only unit; and (2) whether the
Board's determination of the appropriate bargaining unit was arbitrary,
capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. 4
The refusal to admit evidence at the hearing was based on a "per se"
rule established in Mercy Hospitals, Inc.,5 which allows units to be com-
1. 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
2. An offer of proof was allowed, but the hospital maintained that this
offer was limited and that it did not waive objection to the hearing officer's rul-
ing by submitting the limited offer. Id. at 407.
3. 232 N.L.R.B. 32, 97 L.R.R.M. 1297 (1977).
4. The third issue in the case, which will not be discussed in this Note,
was the supervisory status of assistant head nurses. The court found the assistant
head nurses to be properly included in the bargaining unit and deferred to the
Board's decision on this finding of fact. The court held that the decision was
supported by substantial evidence in the record and that it did not conflict
with any congressional directive. 601 F.2d at 422.
5. 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 89 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1975), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 589 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979).
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prised solely of RNs whenever sought. The hospital offered to show that
its organization and its integration of all professional employees made this
case distinguishable from Mercy and that certain factual conclusions
reached in Mercy were wrong and therefore inapplicable. Specifically, the
hospital offered to show that there was no singular history of collective
bargaining by registered nurses in this country, in the Sacramento area
where the hospital in Mercy was located, or in southern California where
the respondent hospital is located.6 The hospital made this offer because
a singular history of separate representation of RNs had been heavily re-
lied upon in Mercy. In response the Board made two distinct arguments:
where registered nurses have sought to bargain, they have done so in units
limited to their own profession; and registered nurses have a community
of interest which entitles them to a separate unit.7
The court held that the hearing officer had erred by refusing the
hospital's evidence supporting an all-professional unit. In addition, the
Board's decision that the unit consisting solely of RNs was appropriate
was held to be arbitrary and capricious. It found that the "per se" policy
that a bargaining unit consisting solely of RNs is presumptively appropriate
when sought in a nonprofit hospital is not consistent with the congressional
directive that the Board give due consideration to prevent undue prolifera-
tion of bargaining units in the health care industry. The court attacked
the bases for Mercy, namely, a singular history of separate representation
among RNs, and a community of interest among RNs. The court said the
"singular history" did not exist and that disparity of interest, not com-
munity of interest, was necessary to justify a separate bargaining unit.8
The court did not say that a bargaining unit consisting solely of RNs can
never be valid,9 but here the rule that such a unit is always valid, coupled
with the exclusion of evidence to the contrary, constituted reversible er-
ror.10 The court said that presumptions may be employed by the Board
so long as interested parties are given the opportunity to present evidence
to rebut the presumptions.11
The court in St. Francis relied heavily on prior law regarding ap-
propriate bargaining units in the health care industry, including the legis-
lative history and decisions of other courts of appeal. A survey of the his-
tory and precedent in this area begins with the National Labor Relations
Act,12 passed in 1935, which was intended by Congress to decrease in-
dustrial strife and encourage collective bargaining among employees.13
6. 601 F.2d at 418.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 419.
9. Id. at 416, 419.
10. Id. at 416.
11. Id.
12. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1976)).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
1980]
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Non-profit hospitals were included, but little collective bargaining was done
in the health care industry.' 4 In 1947, the Taft-Hartley amendments' 5 ex-
cluded nonprofit hospitals, like St. Francis, and their employees from
coverage and protection of the Act.' 6 An increasing amount of labor
unrest, low wages, and poor working conditions in nonprofit private hos-
pitals led Congress to extend the protection of the Act to these employees
in 1974.17
In enacting the 1974 amendments, Congress noted the unique service
of the health care industry and its sensitivity to labor disputes, and accord-
ingly built in several protective mechanisms.' s Congress did not specify
any set number of bargaining units in this industry, leaving that determina-
14. The NLRB asserted jurisdiction over a nonprofit hospital in Central
Dispensary and Emergency Hosp., 44 N.L.R.B. 533, 541, 42-5 CCH 6048 (1942)
("employees of hospitals, like employees of automobile factories, must live upon
their wages"). The Board's decision was upheld in NLRB v. Central Dispensary
and Emergency Hosp., 145 F.2d 852, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
847 (1945) ("We cannot understand what considerations of public policy deprive
hospital employees of the privilege granted to the employees of other insti-tutions.").As early as 1946, registered nurses represented by the California Nurses As-
sociation had their first contract with the San Francisco Bay area hospitals. See
Miller, Development and Structure of Collective Bargaining Among Registered
Nurses, 50 PERSONNEL J. 134 (1971). Nurses associations in Washington, Minnesota,
and Oregon were recognized as bargaining agents for their members as well.
See, e.g., What State Associations Did in 1945, 46 Am. J. NuRSING 67 (1946).
15. Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1976)).
16. The amendment that excluded nonprofit hospitals was offered with the
rationale that hospitals were charitable institutions and not in interstate com-
merce. Senator Tydings of Maryland offered the amendment, and Senator Taylor
of Idaho questioned him: "Mr. Taylor. What would be the effect if nurses in a
hospital should decide to organize. Would it prevent their organization? Mr.
Tydings. I do not think it would." 93 CONG. REc. 4997 (1947). Nurses were not
prevented from organizing under the amendment, but neither were they pro-
tected or encouraged to do so; the organization of nurses and other health care
workers was retarded.
The American Nurses Association and professional engineering societies
argued for separate bargaining units during hearings. As a result, professionals
were given the right to a separate bargaining unit. See Scott & Smith, The Taft-
Hartley Act and the Nurse, 56 A-Ar. J. NURSING 543 (1956).
17. Act of Aug. 25, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169 (1976)). For purposes of the legislation, especially in reference to eliminating
the need for recognitional strikes which had become numerous in the health care
industry, see 601 F.2d at 411; S. 1UP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3948; H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4.
18. These include the requirements of early notice of intent to modify or
terminate a contract, a 10 day strike or picket notice to the health care institution
and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and, if warranted,
a discretionary fact-finding board of inquiry by FMCS. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 171, 183
(1976). The effectiveness of these mechanisms is discussed in FEDERAL MEDIATION
AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ImPACT OF THE 1974 HEALTH CARE AMENDMENTS TO
THE NLRA ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY (1979).
[Vol. 45
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tion to the Board,19 but did direct the Board to give due care to preventing
undue proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry and
noted with approval several decisions the Board recently had made.2 0
Two principal dangers of undue proliferation of bargaining units were
19. Senator Robert Taft introduced a bill which would have provided no
more than four units in the health care industry: professional employees, tech-
nical employees, clerical employees, and service and maintenance employees. The
bill, S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CoNG. REc. 26791 (1973) was not enacted.
In presenting the conference report on the bill which was adopted, Senator Wil-
liams for the Senate conferees stated:
The National Labor Relations Board has shown good judgment in
establishing appropriate units for the purposes of collective bargaining,
particularly in wrestling with units in newly covered industries. While
the Board has, as a rule, tended to avoid an unnecessary proliferation of
collective bargaining units, sometimes circumstances require that there
be a number of bargaining units among non-supervisory employees, par-
ticularly where there is such a history in the area or a notable disparity of
interests between employees in different job classifications.
While the Committee clearly intends that the Board give due con-
sideration to its admonition to avoid an undue proliferation of units in
the health care industry, it did not within this framework intend to pre-
clude the Board acting in the public interest from exercising its specialized
experience and expert knowledge in determining appropriate bargaining
units.
120 CONG. REc. 22575 (1974). The weight to be given these remarks, made after
passage by the House and Senate but before adoption of the conferees' report,
may be great or light with regard to Congress's intent to have the Board exercise
its discretion. The court in St. Francis, while contending that the "history in
the area" was not singular nor impressive, gave great weight to the "disparity of
interest" statement. 601 F.2d at 418-19.
20. The House and Senate Committee Reports state:
Effect on Existing Law-Bargaining Units
Due consideration should be given by the Board to preventing pro-
liferation of bargaining units in the health care industry. In this connec-
tion, the Committee notes with approval the recent Board decisions in
Four Seasons Nursing Center, 408 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 85 L.R.R.M. 1098
(1974), and Woodland Park Hospital, 205 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 84 L.R.R.M.
1074 (1973), as well as the trend towards broader units enunciated in
Extendicare of West Virginia, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 170, 83 L.R.R.M. 1242
(1973).
In footnote 1, the House and Senate reports said, "By our reference to
Extendicare, we do not necessarily approve (all of the holdings) of that decision."
S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. g=
AD. NEws 3950; H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 7. The parenthetical
enclosure indicates language in the Senate Report which is not in the House
Report.
The cases cited in the Committee Reports indicate no change from the normal
pattern in unit determination. In Four Seasons, the Board rejected a proposed
unit of only two maintenance employees. In Woodland Park, the Board rejected
a proposed unit of x-ray technicians. In Extendicare, the Board found appropriate
two units; one of all LPNs and another of all technical employees and service
and maintenance employees. The footnote in the Reports referring to that de-
cision may mean that Congress did not necessarily approve of separate LPN
units-LPNs are now placed in units with other technical employees. For further
discussion of this issue, see note 27 infra. Of course, it could also mean that Con-
gress did not approve of separate LPN units, and that it would not approve of
separate RN units either.
1980]
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foreseen: the possibility of numerous strikes, having the potential to shut
down the facility as other employees honored picket lines; and numerous
bargaining units being utilized in "whipsaw" fashion, each union using
the preceding settlement to increase its wage demands, thus dispropor-
tionately increasing labor costs in the industry.2 1
After the 1974 amendments, the NLRB continued its policy of finding
separate units for registered nurses appropriate.2 2 In 1975 the Board, in
Mercy, overturned a regional director's finding that three units-profes-
sional, service and maintenance, and office clerical-were appropriate.
23
It instead found appropriate the following units: registered nurses, when
they seek to be represented in exclusive units,24 other professional em-
ployees,2 5 service and maintenance employees, and clerical employees.
While the Board in Mercy did not state that its decision was to be estab-
lished policy, it relied on Mercy in Methodist Hospital, Inc.2 6 and found
that a unit of all professionals excluding RNs was presumptively appropri-
ate. Since that time, Board decisions have made possible a total of seven
units in health care institutions, and have consistently permitted units com-
prised solely of RNs whenever sought.27
21. Remarks of Senator Taft, 120 CONG. REc. 12944-45 (1974).
22. In decisions prior to 1974, the Board had found registered nurses to be
professional employees in Reynolds Elec. & Eng'r Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 113, 48
L.R.R.M. 1603 (1961), and Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. 591,
34 L.R.R.M. 1044 (1954). The Board could rely on Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 123
N.L.R.B. 133, 43 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1959), to determine that RNs as professionals
form an appropriate unit for collective bargaining.
23. Mercy Hosps., Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 774 n.43, 89 L.R.R.M. 1097, 1107
n.43 (1975).
24. The Board's wording is important: "[Rlegistered nurses, if they are so
sought and they so desire," are entitled to a separate bargaining unit. Id. at 767,
89 L.R.R.M. at 1100. The court in St. Francis said that the Board did not always
adhere to its Mercy decision and cited Family Doctor Medical Group, 226 N.L.R.B.
118, 93 L.R.R.M. 1193 (1976). In that case, however, the unit being sought in-
cluded RNs with lab technicians and dieticians, and not RNs as a separate unit.
The Board's inclusion of RNs in a larger unit, then, was not contrary to Mercy.
25. The Board heard oral argument and received briefs amicus curiae from
a number of parties, including the American Nurses Association and other health
care professional associations, in this consolidated case to determine health care
facility bargaining units. The Board concluded: "[T]hese individual professional
groups have failed to demonstrate the kind or degree of separate representa-
tion ... so important to our finding that RNs may constitute a separate profes-
sional bargaining unit." 217 N.L.R.B. at 769, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1102.
26. 223 N.L.R.B. 1509, 92 L.R.R.M. 1198 (1976).
27. The Mercy decision allowed four separate units, not five as stated in
St. Francis. 601 F.2d at 414 n.11. The confusion arises over "supplemental em-
ployees." While this is a separate heading in the Mercy decision, closer reading
reveals that these are similar to part-time or temporary employees. The Board
decided they would be eligible to vote, but they would be part of the other
four units (most in the service and maintenance unit) and would not constitute a
separate unit by themselves.
Mercy established the four units listed; technical employees were made a
fifth separate unit in Barnert Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 217 N.L.R.B. 775, 89
L.R.R.M. 1083 (1975), and LPNs were placed in the technical unit in St. Cath-
erine's Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 787, 89 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1975). Doctors could constitute
[Vol. 45
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St. Francis is the first decision to overturn the Board on an RN unit
determination. Some of the Board's decisions regarding hospital units of
maintenance employees have been overturned on grounds of undue pro-
liferation,28 while other health care unit decisions have been upheld.2 9 In
overruling the Board on maintenance unit determinations, some courts
have found that the community of interest test is not an adequate standard
in the health care industry.30 The court in St. Francis cited cases question-
ing the community of interest test for maintenance worker units in its
own search for an appropriate test for registered nurse units. 31
The decision disagreed with the Board's Merry holding on two counts:
a singular history of separate representation among RNs, and a community
of interest test for determining appropriate units in the health care in-
dustry. The first objection may be overcome on remand; the court did
not object to the Board's use of collective bargaining history as a factor
in the unit determination, but questioned whether RNs in fact have such
a history. The deficiencies in the record on this point are correctable. 32
the sixth unit. Ohio Valley Hosp. Ass'n, 230 N.L.R.B. 604, 95 L.R.R.M. 1430
(1977). A seventh unit comprised of guards would even be possible under 29
U.S.C. § 159 (b) (3) (1976). Several decisions of the Board have permitted separate
units of maintenance employees. See notes 28 &: 29 infra. See generally Morales,
Unit Appropriateness in Health Care Institutions, 30 LAB. L.J. 174 (1979).
28. NLRB v. Mercy Hosps. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979) (23 person
maintenance unit); Long Island College Hosp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 966 (1977) (Board decision extending comity to state labor
board decision allowing a separate maintenance unit); Allegheney Hosp. v. NLRB,
608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979) (maintenance unit); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB,
567 F.2d 588 (8d Cir. 1977); Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351 (3d Cir.
1976) (also a Board extension of comity to a maintenance unit decided by a
state labor board); NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978)
(21 person maintenance unit).
29. The courts have approved health care units determined by the Board in
non-maintenance units. For example, in Bay Medical Center v. NLRB, 588 F.2d
1174 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 53 (1979), the court upheld, on the
basis of a history of separate bargaining, a Board decision finding a unit of
practical nurses to be separate. The court stated, "Courts have long recognized that
the Board may take bargaining history into account when determining whether
a proposed bargaining unit is appropriate." Id. at 1177. See Libbey-Owens Ford
Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974);
NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159, 1165 (5th Cir. 1970). In NLRB v. Sweet-
water Hosp. Ass'n, 604 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1979), the court found a technical unit
decision appropriate and indicated that the Board "has not yet caused such frag-
mentation as to violate the ... mandate." Id. at 458.
30. See NLR.B v. Mercy Hosps. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979); St. Vincent's
Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
31. 601 F.2d at 416, 418. Specifically, the court cited Long Island College
Hosp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 966 (1977);
St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977); Memorial Hosp. v.
NLRB, 545 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1976); NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d
213 (7th Cir. 1978).
32. RNs were bargaining in separate units long before the protection of the
Act was extended. See note 14 supra. In 1965, an American Nurses Association
(ANA) report to state constituents indicated that 25,300 RNs were represented
at their place of employment by state nurses associations, with 9685 of those
covered by formal contracts. ANA, Summary of State Nurses Association Economic
1980]
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If substantial evidence that the exclusively RN unit is appropriate is pre-
sented on remand in St. Francis, the burden will then be on the employer
to show that the unit is clearly not appropriate.3 3 Indeed, a Ninth Circuit
case has held that the burden is on the employer to prove that the Board's
unit determination is wrong in a registered nurse bargaining unit.3 4
The second area of disagreement the court in St. Francis found with
Mercy was the use of the community of interest test. Community of interest
is a traditional Board test of appropriateness of unit,3 5 but in St. Francis
the court held that the proper test for determining an appropriate unit in
the health care industry should not be community of interest, but dis-
Security Program Activities (Sept. 23, 1966). By July 1974, the state nurses as-
sociations had 540 contracts in force covering 69,209 individuals. ANA, Constituent
Report on Economic and General Welfare Activities (Nov. 25, 1974).
Twelve states provided legislation prior to the 1974 NLRA amendments
which covered some employees of nonprofit hospitals: Connecticut, Hawaii, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. In Oregon and Montana the statutes
provide protection for RNs and LPNs only; in Massachusetts the statute was
passed first for nurses, and extended to other employees later. State nurses as-
sociations initiated and lobbied in favor of such legislation. See, e.g., Mahoney
& Conlon, Bargaining Rights for Nurses, 66 AM. J. NURSING 544 (1966).
The Board had recognized RN community of interest in decisions affecting
proprietary hospitals after asserting jurisdiction over those facilities. See note 22
supra. See also Diversified Health Servs.. Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 461, 73 L.R.R.M.
1038 (1969); Standard Oil Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1022, 23 L.R.R.M. 1189 (1948);
Consolidated Steel Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 97, 42-5 CCH 6726 (1945); American Steel
& Wire Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 253, 15 L.R.R.M. 50 (1944); Hudson Motor Car Co.,
45 N.L.R.B. 55, 11 L.R.R.M. 99 (1942).
The consistent selection of the state nurses association affiliates of the ANA,
which with few exceptions represent RNs exclusively, also indicates a history of
separate bargaining by RNs. Of the 180,000 nurses under contract in the United
States, ANA affiliates represent 110,000. Gideon, American Nurses Association:
A Professional Model for Collective Bargaining, 2 J. HFA.LTH & HusAN REsoURcEs
AD. 14 (1979). The union in St. Francis is a spinoff of the California Nurses As-
sociation and sought an RN only unit.
Argument can be made that history of bargaining after 1975, when the Board
started finding RN only units, should be disregarded as evidence because there
was no other choice than RN only bargaining. The Board, however, made it
clear in Mercy and in subsequent decisions that when a broader unit than RN
only is sought by the employees, it can be had. RNs have sought to be represented
in units comprised solely of RNs so consistently that this has provided a now
massive history of separate unit bargaining.
The employer and the court in St. Francis pointed to the minority of nurses
in the nation and in the area of the St. Francis hospital who were represented in
separate bargaining units, but this is merely a reflection that a minority of RNs
in the industry are organized. About 130,000 of the 900,000 RNs working in the
United States are now working under collective bargaining agreements. Gideon,
id. The fact that many nurses are not organized into collective bargaining units
is of questionable relevance to the issue of whether those who are organized are
in RN only units.
33. NLRB v. J.C. Penney Co., 559 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1977).
34. NLRB v. Doctors' Hosp., 489 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1973) (the issue per-
tained to supervisors in an RN only unit and was decided prior to the 1974
amendments).
35. NLRB v. Sunnyland Ref. Co., 474 F.2d 407, 409, 410 (5th Cir. 1973);
NLRB v. Belcher Towing Co., 284 F.2d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1960).
[Vol. 45
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parity of interest.86 This "disparity of interest" test is gleaned from the
legislative history of the 1974 health care amendments; specifically, from
one remark of Senator Williams.3t The court did not define its disparity
test, but it may be similar to the theory expressed by Board member
Penello in his dissent in Allegheney General Hospital3s in which he sug-
gested that a super community of interest test is necessary. The court did
say that the traditional community of interest test would be "subordinated"
to the directive against undue proliferation and suggested a balance be-
tween the congressional mandate and the employees' right to representa-
tion.3 9 If Congress's directive to avoid undue proliferation in health care
facilities means that a test different from community of interest must be
employed in those bargaining unit determinations, a substantial change
in unit determinations in the health care industry will be in order. It
would also mean far less Board discretion would be permitted in this in-
dustry than in others. The Board's authority in unit determinations in
other industries involves "of necessity, a large measure of informed discre-
tion and the decision of the Board, if not final, is rarely to be disturbed." 40
In a conflicting decision subsequent to St. Francis, the Board in Gar-
den City Hospital4' decided to continue to use the community of interest
test in health care bargaining unit determinations. The Board has accepted
the remand in St. Francis, but is seeking certiorari in NLRB v. Mercy
Hospital Association.42 At least one Board member has indicated that
36. On review of the Mercy decision on the narrow issue of whether the
Board's refusal to accept the parties' stipulation of unit was arbitrary, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals said, "[Ulse of this doctrine [community of interest] is
entirely proper... where the appropriate bargaining unit is disputed." NLRB v.
Mercy Hosps., Inc., 589 F.2d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 1978). The court apparently ap-
proved the community of interest standard in health care institutions in that case,
though it found this standard to be insufficient to override a stipulation by the
parties where it had been a Board policy to accept such stipulations. Mercy Hosps.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 589 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1978).
37. For the text of the remark, see note 19 supra.
38. 239 N.L.R.B. 104, 100 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1978), rev'd, 608 F.2d 965 (3d
Cir. 1979).
39. 601 F.2d at 419.
40. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947). See also
South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S.
800 (1976).
41. 244 N.L.R.B. 108, 102 L.R.R.M. 1146 (1979).
42. 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979). Telephone conversation with Linda Sher,
Associate General Counsel for Supreme Court Litigation, Washington, D.C.
(Jan. 3, 1979). In response to the decisions of the various circuits, the Board con-
sidered what Congress meant by "proliferation" in Allegheney Gen. Hosp., 239
N.L.R.B. 104, 100 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1978). In deciding to use a community of in-
terest test for maintenance worker units in hospitals, the Board indicated the fol-
lowing factors: similarity of wages and hours, frequency of contact, degree of in-
terchange and functional integration, area practice and patterns of bargaining,
and history of bargaining of employees who would be in the unit. As noted
earlier, that Board decision was recently overturned. Allegheney Gen. Hosp. v.
NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979). In Garden City Hosp., 244 N.L.R.B. 108,
102 L.R.R.M. 1146 (1979), the Board reaffirmed its 1978 Allegheney decision and
1980]
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the Board may continue the policy of allowing RN only units.
4 3
Assuming a base of substantial evidence is obtained on the RN his-
tory of separate bargaining and community of interest, will the Ninth
Circuit and other courts of appeal uphold an RN only unit, absent indi-
cation from the Board that it has specifically considered or "subordinated"
those factors to the public interest? RN only units are presently being
found appropriate in Board unit determinations. Based on past decisions,
those determinations will be upheld in the Sixth Circuit,44 might not be
upheld in the Ninth,45 and how they will fare in other circuits is an open
question.
The immediate effect is that hearing officers will let evidence in re-
garding all-professional units whenever RN units are sought. The likely
effect of this is to increase delay and expense to employee groups seeking
representation as well as to employers seeking to defeat such representation.
Once determinations are made, it is probable that more section 9 (d)
"end runs" 40 such as existed in St. Francis will be encouraged. Here, the
petition was filed in 1976 and the employees are not yet to the bargaining
table. The cost to the hospital of pursuing the appeal was undoubtedly
substantial; this cost will ultimately be borne by the consumers of health
care.
Whether or not the Board's decisions promote "undue proliferation,"
the congressional intent behind that mandate must be remembered. As
noted earlier, the fears of extending the protection of the Act to health
care workers with possible proliferation of units were that strikes would
result, along with whipsaw wage increases. There is at least some evidence
to indicate that these fears are not being realized, even under the Board's
present community of interest test.
47
indicated it will continue use of the community of interest test in such bargaining
unit determinations.
43. Personal conversation with Howard Jenkins, NLR.B member, at Colum-
bia, Missouri (Oct. 25, 1979).
44. Bay Medical Center v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 53 (1979).
45. NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
46. Direct review of bargaining unit determination is not available under
29 U.S.C. § 159 (d) (1976) unless the Board violates a clear and mandatory pro-
vision of the NLRA. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). The route to review is a refusal to bargain after the
unit is certified, unfair labor practice charge and complaint, and appeal of the
subsequent Board order to bargain.
47. The FMCS documents a lower strike rate in the health care industry
than in other industries-4% rate in health care versus 15% in other industries-
even though many of the contracts are first contracts, a more strike-prone situation.
Barrett, A Discussion, 28 LAB. L.J. 525 (1977). Whipsaw wage increases are not
affecting costs greatly; only a small part of the staggering increases in the cost of
hospital care is attributable to wages. Rises in labor costs are actually declining.
Wage-Price Council Says Rising Wages Are Small Factor in Hospital Cost Infla-
tion, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) 9-10 (Jan. 20, 1977). The whole issue of prolifera-
tion seems overrated. In only 117 of 2585 bargaining situations, approximately 4%
of the time, did two or more unions represent workers within one institution. Of
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